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NOTES
Hitting Deadbeat Parents Where it
Hurts: "Punitive" Mechanisms in Child
Support Enforcement
This Note discusses the crisis created by "problem parents" who
fail to meet their child support obligations. Alaska has not es-
caped this crisis. This Note traces the efforts in Alaska to exact
payment from child support obligors through both civil and
criminal provisions. In particular, it discusses the recent expan-
sion of criminal provisions, including the criminalization of aiding
and abetting nonpayment of child support obligations and the
suspension, revocation or denial of driver's and occupational li-
censes. The Note suggests several ways in which Alaska can
strengthen its criminal provisions to improve enforcement, and it
analyzes the constitutionality of Alaska's license revoca-
tion/suspension provisions. Finally, the Note suggests another
method by which to increase the rate of child support payment,
namely the use of "most wanted" lists.
I. INTRODUCTION
The crisis in child support in the United States, and in Alaska,
is one of immense proportions. This crisis can be traced directly to
the failure of numerous noncustodial parents to make their child
support payments. In 1992, only 54% of single-parent families
with children had an established child support order.' Of those
families, only about one-half received the full amount due.2 Stud-
ies indicate that two-fifths of divorced fathers in the United States
Copyright © 1997 by Alaska Law Review
1. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-430, § 101(4) (1995), available in 1995 WL
767839, at *21. This statistic does not indicate that the remaining 46% of single-
parent families have no method of child support. Some of those families have a
private legal agreement or a more informal agreement. However, these private
agreements are not enforceable through the child support enforcement mecha-
nisms discussed in this Note.
2. See id.
ALASKA LAW REVIEW
do not pay child support.3 In Alaska, more than $416 million in
child support is overdue.4 Officials estimate that 8% of the na-
tion's Aid to Families with Dependent Children ("AFDC")
caseload could be wiped out if all child support debts were col-
lected.5 Since the average number of children receiving AFDC was
9.3 million in 1992,6 eradication of even a small portion of the wel-
fare rolls would affect a large number of children.
Over the years, the United States Congress and the Alaska
State Legislature have each enacted numerous provisions to com-
bat this problem. Although overall collections have increased due
to these enactments, there remains a stubborn core of noncustodial
parents who are delinquent in their child support payments and
simply refuse to pay. Reflecting a trend frequently called a
"crackdown on deadbeat dads," more stringent enforcement provi-
sions have recently been added to deal with "problem parents"
who flagrantly refuse to support their children. These new child
support enforcement provisions have been highly publicized and
include the following: (1) criminal statutes punishing nonpayment
of child support;7 (2) revocation, denial and suspension of licenses
of individuals who are delinquent in their child support payments;8
and (3) publication of "most wanted" lists consisting of individuals
whose delinquency in their child support payments is both egre-
gious and contemptible. 9 Alaska currently has in effect criminal
statutes and statutes authorizing the revocation, denial and suspen-
sion of licenses for nonpayment of child support.
The criminalization of the nonpayment of child support obli-
gations is not a new phenomenon in Alaska. '0 What is new, how-
ever, is the recent expansion of criminal provisions in this area to
cover the aiding and abetting of nonpayment of child support obli-
3. See Janet Dayal, Population: Marriage and Motherhood Can be a Path to
Poverty, Inter Press Service, May 30, 1995, available in LEXIS, NEWS Library,
CURNWS File (citing POPULATION COUNCIL, FAMILIES IN Focus: NEW PER-
SPECTIVES ON MOTHERS, FATHERS AND CHILDREN (1995)).
4. See No Driving for Parents Who Owe, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Oct. 13,
1996, at B1.
5. See Desda Moss, Agencies Declare War on Deadbeat Parents, USA
TODAY, Apr. 18, 1995, at 4A. About 11 million families are owed child support.
See id.
6. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-430, § 101(5)(A)(i)(IV) (1995), available in
1995 WL 767839, at *21.
7. See infra notes 71-143 and accompanying text.
& See infra notes 144-209 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 210-238 and accompanying text.
10. See, e.g., Act of July 17, 1978, ch. 166, 1978 Alaska Sess. Laws § 5
(codified at ALASKA STAT. § 11.51.120 (Michie 1996)).
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gations."1 Also, federal law was recently expanded to criminalize
nonpayment of child support obligations with respect to children
who reside in other states.' In addition to these criminal provi-
sions, the Alaska legislature has recently enacted a law, as required
by a recent public law passed by the United States Congress, that
requires the Department of Public Safety to suspend the driver's
licenses of obligors who are not in substantial compliance with a
child support order." Indeed, licensing agencies may not issue or
renew certain occupational and professional licenses of delinquent
obligors. 5 Although Alaska currently has no provisions authoriz-
ing the posting of "most wanted lists" of delinquent obligors, cre-
ating such provisions has previously been considered in Alaska and
may someday be enacted. 6
The underlying goal of criminalization of nonsupport, license
revocation or denial and "most wanted" posters of delinquent ob-
ligors is to "hit deadbeat parents where it hurts"-by taking away a
deadbeat parent's freedom, by taking away the driver's or occupa-
tional license essential for earning a livelihood and by harming a
deadbeat parent's reputation in the community. Commentators
have criticized this goal, arguing that "punitive" efforts in child
support enforcement are misplaced because they fail to address the
reasons why many delinquent obligors disregard their child sup-
port obligations.' While criminal provisions (which include the
11. See, e.g., Act of June 6, 1994, ch. 86, 1994 Alaska Sess. Laws § 3 (codified
at ALASKA STAT. § 11.51.122 (Michie 1996)).
12. See Child Support Recovery Act of 1992, 18 U.S.C. § 228 (1994).
13. See Personal Responsibility & Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 369, 110 Stat. 2105, 2251 (1996) (amending 42
U.S.C.A. § 666 (a)(16) (West Supp. 1997). The law requires states to implement
procedures which would give the state authority to withhold or suspend the li-
censes of individuals owing overdue support. The bill applies to driver's licenses,
professional licenses, and recreational licenses. See id.
14. See ALASKA STAT. § 25.27.246 (Michie 1996).
15. See id. § 25.27.244.
16. See Op. Alaska Att'y Gen. No. 366-688-83 (July 11, 1983); see also Infor-
mal Op. Alaska Att'y Gen. No. 661-89-0405 (May 30, 1989).
17. See Monica J. Allen, Child-State Jurisdiction: A Due Process Invitation to
Reconsider Some Basic Family Law Assumptions, 26 FAM. L. Q. 293, 312-13
(1992). Some commentators have suggested that noncustodial parents might dis-
regard child support obligations because (1) they "think of child support as a
payment to their former partners rather than as fulfillment of an obligation wed
to the children directly", (2) "they are dissatisfied with custody or visitation ar-
rangements", (3) "they resent new enforcement measures" or (4) they resent the
fact that "child support orders.., sever the duty to support one's children from
the right to control their actions." Id. (citing LENORE J. WEITZMAN, THE
DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE UNEXPECrED SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONSE-
QUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA 265 (1985); Leslie J. Harris et
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possibility of significant jail time) are clearly punitive, the punitive
aspects of the license revocation, denial and suspension programs
and the publication of "most wanted" lists are perhaps not as obvi-
ous. The argument is that punishing a delinquent obligor with
revocation or denial of his or her license will merely prevent the
obligor from working to meet his or her obligations, thus frustrat-
ing the goal of recovery of support.
In addition, some critics have reacted unfavorably to the effort
to "shame" delinquent obligors into meeting their obligations."8 In
essence, this criticism assumes that punitive provisions are im-
proper and ineffective and that enforcement provisions ought to
include incentives rather than punishment. In response to this
criticism, legislators generally point to two factors: (1) there is
strong public support of the "punitive" efforts;19 and (2) the
"punitive" efforts have proven quite effective so far.2?
This Note examines recent efforts in Alaska to "hit deadbeat
parents where it hurts" through punitive child support enforce-
ment provisions, focusing on practical and legal issues raised by
each provision. Although these provisions may be regarded as pu-
nitive, the Note argues that their underlying policies and their suc-
al., Making and Breaking Connections Between Parents' Duty to Support and
Right to Control Their Children, 69 OR. L. REv. 689 (1990)); see also Raymond I.
Parnas & Sherry Cermak, Rethinking Child Support, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 759,
761 (1989) (concluding that research does not support financial inability as the
primary reason for nonpayment of child support).
1& See, e.g., Roger J.R. Levesque, Targeting "Deadbeat" Dads: The Problem
With the Direction of Welfare Reform, 15 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 1, 32
(1994) (arguing in part that "the preoccupation with the absent father's fault and
irresponsibility displaces awareness of the limited resources of many absent fa-
thers and of the administrative costs of 'making them pay').
19. See, e.g., Hearings Before the Alaska House Judicial Comm., 18th Leg.
tape 94-58, side A, n.850 (1994). During that meeting, Mary Gay, Director, Child
Support Enforcement Division ("CSDE"), testifying in support of House Bill 362,
enacted as Alaska Statute sections 11.51.122 (Michie 1996), made the following
statement: "I also believe that this legislation, when one or two cases occur, will
send a message to society: That this type of activity is going to be met with a pen-
alty. And they will refrain from [failing to make child support payments or aiding
such failure]." Representative Jeannette James replied, "I like that position." Id.
20. In Fiscal Year 1996, $12 billion in child support was collected. Hearings
Before the U.S. House of Representatives Subcomm. on Human Resources of the
House Comm. on Ways and Means, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. (1997) (statement of
David Gray Ross, Deputy Director, Office of Child Support Enforcement, U.S.
Dept. of Health & Human Services). This amount exceeds President Clinton's
budget projection of $11.5 billion. See id. Most significantly, the amount col-
lected represented a 50% increase in collection since Fiscal Year 1992, and the
number of paying child support cases had also increased-by an impressive 36%.
See id.
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cess in increasing the recovery of child support justifies the use of
these provisions in Alaska. Before turning to these mechanisms,
Part I of this Note briefly discusses the civil child support en-
forcement provisions currently available and why it was necessary
to adopt the stricter, punitive enforcement mechanisms. Part III
then analyzes the criminal sanctions available through Alaska state
law and federal law for enforcing payment of child support obliga-
tions and provides suggestions for strengthening the state law pro-
visions. Part IV discusses Alaska's new law that revokes, suspends
or denies licenses of delinquent obligors and analyzes the law's
constitutionality. Finally, Part V encourages the enactment of a
"most wanted list" in Alaska to complement existing punitive leg-
islation and to increase the success of exacting child support pay-
ments from "problem parents."
II. BACKGROUND
A. Civil Child Support Enforcement Provisions
The civil provisions currently in effect in Alaska encourage
payment of child support obligations in a variety of ways. Most
obviously, Alaska has enacted legislation empowering an adminis-
trative agency to oversee collection and enforcement efforts.2' In
addition, Alaska has provisions designed to encourage the en-
forcement of child support obligations that arise in another state. 2
Enforcement of child support payments is achieved through
several means. Under Alaska Statutes section 25.25.305, the supe-
rior court and the Child Support Enforcement Division ("CSED")
have not only the power to issue support orders, they are also em-
powered to do the following: (1) order income withholding;' (2)
specify a method of payment for arrearages; 24 (3) enforce orders by
civil or criminal contempt, or both; ' (4) set aside property for sat-
isfaction of the support order;2 6 (5) place liens and order execution
on the obligor's property;2' (6) order the obligor to seek appropri-
ate employment by specified methods; ' (7) award attorney fees
21. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 25.27.010 et seq. (Michie 1996).
22. See Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, ALASKA STAT. §§ 25.25.101 et
seq. (Michie 1996).
23. See ALASKA STAT. § 25.25.305(b)(3) (Michie 1996); see also id. §
25.27.062. The CSED can also order withholding from unemployment benefits.
See id. § 23.20.401.
24. See id. § 25.25.305(b)(4).
25. See id. § 25.25.305(b)(5).
26. See id. § 25.25.305(b)(6).
27. See id. § 25.25.305(b)(7); see also id. §§ 25.27.230-.253.
28. See id. § 25.25.305(b)(10).
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and costs; 29 (8) report payment history of obligor to credit bureaus
and lending institutions; and (9) "grant any other available rem-
edy."31 Indeed, the "administrative remedies available to [the]
CSED provide the agency with an exceptional degree of power.",
2
In addition, under Alaska Statutes section 09.38.065(a)(1)(A),
a "creditor may make a levy against exempt property of any kind
to enforce a claim for child support." 3  Although 45% of the an-
nual Permanent Fund Dividend ("PFD") is ordinarily exempt from
any remedy for collection of debt, no part of an individual's PFD is
exempt from child support obligations.' The Alaska legislature
has also provided for a lenient statute of limitations for the time
during which actions to establish judgments for child support pay-
ments must be brought.35 Finally, the legislature has placed limita-
tions on loans to persons who are in arrears on child support pay-
ment obligations.
In addition to the procedures currently available through
Alaska law, there are additional methods by which payment of
child support obligations can be encouraged, or forced, under fed-
eral law. For example, the Full Faith and Credit for Child Support
Orders Act" is a complement to state laws such as the Uniform In-
terstate Family Support Ace8 ("UIFSA") relating to enforcement
and modification of out-of-state child support orders, and it estab-
lishes national standards for the enforcement of out-of-state child
29. See id. § 25.25.305(b)(11).
30. See id. § 25.25.305; see also id. § 25.27.273.
31. Id. §25.25.305.
32. State v. Allsop, 902 P.2d 790, 794 (Alaska 1995) (citing ALASKA STAT. §
25.27.250 (Michie 1996) (granting CSED the power to issue orders to withhold
and deliver obligors' real or personal property)); see ALASKA STAT. § 25.27.230
(providing that CSED may record liens upon obligors' real or personal property);
see also id. § 25.27.253 (providing that CSED may record liens that direct the
state to withhold earnings and tax refunds).
33. ALASKA STAT. § 09.38.065(a)(1)(A) (Michie 1996).
34. See id. § 43.23.065.
35. See id. § 09.10.040(b) (providing that "an action may be brought to estab-
lish a judgment for child support payments that are 30 or more days past due un-
der a support order ... if the action is commenced by the date on which the
youngest child covered by the support order becomes 21 years of age").
36. See Alaska Agricultural Loan Act, ALASKA STAT. § 03.10.030(i) (Michie
1996); Scholarship Loan Program, ALASKA STAT. § 14.43.125(a)(4) (Michie 1996);
Commercial Fishing Loan Act, ALASKA STAT. §§ 16.10.300-.370 (Michie 1996);
ALASKA STAT. § 18.56.096(a)(7) (Michie 1996); id. §§ 18.56.440(6), 26.15.130,
27.09.020,45.88.020,45.89.030.
37. Pub. L. No. 103-383, 108 Stat. 4063 (1994) (codified at 28 U.S.C.A. §
1738B (West Supp. 1996)).
38. ALASKA STAT. §§ 25.25.101 et seq. (Michie 1996).
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support orders?9 Since interstate cases account for 30% of the na-
tion's 17 million cases,' this law affects a significant portion of
child support enforcement efforts. The act requires states to
"enforce according to its terms a child support order made consis-
tently with this section by a court of another state," and forbids
states from "seek[ing] or mak[ing] a modification of such an or-
der., 4' The rendering state has continued, exclusive jurisdiction
over the order as long as the child for whom support is ordered re-
sides in the state or the state remains the residence of any contest-
ant in the matter.42 In the enforcement of out-of-state child sup-
port orders, the law of the forum state applies.4 This act was
designed "to facilitate the enforcement of child support orders
among the [s]tates... [and] to avoid jurisdictional competition and
conflict among [s]tate courts in the establishment of child support
orders."'"
In addition to the requirements for uniform enforcement of
out-of-state child support orders, the federal government has sev-
eral provisions designed to enhance enforcement. These provi-
sions include the following: (1) mandatory garnishment of federal
employees' pay;45 (2) attachment of the insurance and annuity
payments of government employees;' (3) a requirement that all
credit reporting agencies must include information on overdue
child support obligations for the preceding seven years;47 and (4)
mandatory withholding of past-due support from federal tax re-
funds.'" In order "to provide incentives to reduce welfare depend-
ency, promote self-sufficiency, [and] increase child support pay-
ments," the federal government will also provide a bonus to each
state that provides job training to "absent parents of children re-
ceiving aid to families with dependent children... who subsequent
39. See id
40. See Moss, supra note 5, at 4A.
41. Pub. L. No. 103-383, § 3, 108 Stat. at 4064.
42. See id- § 3, 108 Stat. at 4064.
43. See id. § 3, 108 Stat. at 4065. However, when interpreting an out-of-state
child support order, the law of the rendering state applies. See id. Also, the fo-
rum state's court must apply the statute of limitations of the forum state or the
rendering state, whichever is longer. See id.
44. Id. § 2, 108 Stat. at 4064.
45. See 5 U.S.C.A. § 5520a (West 1996).
46. See 5 U.S.C. § 8437(e)(3) (1994).
47. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1681s-1 (West Supp. 1996).
48. See 42 U.S.C. § 664 (1994). This withholding applies only when the
amount of the past-due support owed at the time of the withholding is equal to or
greater than $500. See id. § 664 (b)(2)(A). The amounts withheld will be dis-
bursed to the state agency for distribution. See id. § 666(a)(1).
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to such training pay child support for their children."49
Congress has also set forth a list of procedures that the states
are statutorily required to undertake in order to improve the effec-
tiveness of child support enforcement.? States are now required to
implement the following procedures: (1) withholding income; 1 (2)
withholding from state income tax;5 (3) imposing liens against real
and personal property for amounts of overdue support; 3 (4) re-
leasing information regarding the amount of overdue support
owed by an absent parent to any consumer reporting agency; 4 and
(5) including provisions for withholding from wages in all child
support orders.55
B. Weaknesses of the Civil Child Support Enforcement
Provisions
Of all the child support enforcement provisions available,
wage withholding is by far the most effective enforcement tech-
nique, accounting for 55% of the total collections nationally in fis-
cal year 1994.6 Withholding of unemployment compensation and
federal and state income tax refunds are also powerful enforce-
ment tools.' However, these mechanisms often miss a significant
portion of noncustodial parents. While wage-earning obligors who
are one month late in making their payments can have their wages
withheld, s obligors who are self-employed, who are independent
contractors, or who change jobs frequently-in short, obligors who
do not earn a wage that can be attached-are not subject to wage
withholding. Noncustodial parents can defeat withholding by pur-
posefully changing employers or willfully hiding income to elude
49. 29 U.S.C. § 1791 (1994).
50. See 42 U.S.C. § 666 (West Supp. 1997).
51. See id. § 666(a)(1).
52. See id. § 666 (a)(3)(A). The amount by which the refund is reduced shall
be distributed to the child or parent to whom such support is owed. See id. § 666
(a)(3)(B).
53. See id. § 666(a)(4).
54. See id. § 666(a)(7).
55. See id. § 666(a)(8)(A).
56. See OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, NINETEENTH ANNUAL
REPORT TO CONGRESS (1994). Wage withholding "is the most effective enforce-
ment mechanism when an obligor has a regular source of income because it allows
for the collection of current support and arrearages." MARGARET CAMPBELL-
HAYNES ET AL., CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT MANUAL § VII (1989).
57. See OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, supra note 56. Collec-
tively, they account for an additional 9% of total collections during fiscal year
1994. See id.
58. See ALASKA STAT. § 25.27.062(c)(2) (Michie 1996).
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their child support obligations. In addition, obligors who are not
due any tax refund will not be affected by tax refund interception.
Successful tax interception also proves difficult, since a request for
tax interception may be delayed for years.Y
The latest statistics show that although the return on the
money spent under child support enforcement programs is posi-
tive-$3.98 is collected for each enforcement dollar spent-the net
collections are rather dismal. 1 Of the approximately $35 billion in
child support payments owed nationwide, more than $27 billion
remained uncollected at the end of fiscal year 1992.62 During that
year, more than 5.7 of the 8.5 million noncustodial parents owing
child support made no payment on the amount owed." In addi-
tion, while 43% of unmarried mothers above the poverty level re-
ceive child support, only 25% of unmarried poor mothers receive
child support. In Alaska, the CSED is currently handling 42,400
child-support cases involving 68,000 children,65 and it is receiving
collections only from approximately 46% of their case load. 6
In an effort to collect from these elusive noncustodial parents,
for whom the existing civil mechanisms do not work, legislatures
and child support enforcement agencies across the country have
increasingly turned to alternative mechanisms as a last resort. In-
cluded in these mechanisms are criminal sanctions for nonsupport.
Criminal sanctions have four main advantages over the numerous
civil remedies available for enforcing child support orders: (1) a lo-
cal prosecutor may provide swifter enforcement than a backlogged
59. See Janelle T. Calhoun, Comment, Interstate Child Support Enforcement:
Juggernaut of Bureaucracy, 46 MERCER L. REv. 921, 933 (1995).
60. See iL at 935 (citing Child Support Enforcement, 1994: Hearings Before
the U.S. Senate Subcomm. on Federal Servs., Post Office, and Civil Serv. of the
Senate Comm. on Gov'tal Affairs, 103d Cong., 2nd Sess. (1994) (statement of Pat
Addison, Program Specialist, Virginia Division of Child Support Enforcement).
61. See Ellen Debenport, GOP Welfare Reform Set for House Vote, ST.
PETERSBERG TIMES, Mar. 24, 1995, at 1A (citing 1993 statistics listed in the 1994
GREEN BOOK, a compilation of data by the House Ways and Means Committee).
A recent report by a congressional conference indicated that only 18% of the
caseload has any collection at all. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-430, § 101(4)
(1995), available in 1995 WL 767839, at *21.
62. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE REPORTS & TESTIMONY, CHILD
SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT: CREDIT BUREAU REPORTING SHOWS PROMISE (1994).
63. See id.
64. See id.
65. See Child-Support Agency to Get More Funding, ANCHORAGE DAILY
NEWS, Apr. 6, 1995, at D4.
66. See Hearings Before the Alaska House Comm. on Health & Human Servs.,
18th Leg. tape 94-61, side B, n.927 (1994) (statement of Phillip Petrie, Acting Op-
erations Manager, CSED).
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child support enforcement agency; (2) criminal enforcement may
act as a deterrent, reducing recidivism for a particular defendant
and reducing the tendency of the rest of the population to commit
the crime; (3) the threat of extradition in interstate cases may en-
courage compliance with court orders; and (4) the criminalization
of the nonpayment of child support demonstrates state and federal
legislatures' realization that it is "a serious threat not only to the
children who suffer, but to society as a whole."67
III. PUNITIVE PROVISIONS
The Alaska State Legislature's condemnation of a parent's
failure to meet his or her child support obligations is clearly set out
in Chapter 144 of the 1984 Alaska Session Laws, which is an act
designed to "enhance efforts to enforce the requirements that par-
ents pay the cost of rearing their children and thereby enhance the
quality of life for all Alaskans."' The legislature found that "the
effect on the general public of the failure of parents to support
their children is vast and far reaching. The harmful effects of un-
paid child support touch not only the poor but reach far beyond,
diminishing the overall quality of life for all Alaskans."69 The leg-
islature further stated:
[A] disproportionately high percentage of lower-income, single-
parent families are headed by women. The difficulties in ob-
taining child support from noncustodial parents contributes sig-
nificantly to the hardship of those families. The fact that the
general public bears the huge monetary cost of supporting fami-
lies on public assistance because of inadequate support from
noncustodial parents is only one of the most obvious effects of
the problem of unpaid child support. In addition, it is recognized
that the failure of parents to support their children is a major
factor contributing to the broader social problems of child abuse
and delinquency. Even when families are able to survive without
public assistance, the hardship experienced by a family, and par-
ticularly by the children in that family, is usually substantial.
These findings provide the rationale for Alaska's criminalization of
nonpayment of child support.
A. State Criminal Provisions
1. Alaska Statutes section 11.51.120. Reflecting the view that
67. Eleanor H. Landstreet, State and Federal Criminal Nonsupport Prosecu-
tion, FAIR$HARE, July 1993, at 16.
68. Act of July 3, 1984, ch. 144, 1984 Alaska Sess. Laws § 1(d) (codified at
ALASKA STAT. § 01.10.070 (Michie 1996)).
69. Id. § 1(a).
70. IA § 1(b).
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nonpayment of child support obligations is an activity (or, to be
precise, a nonactivity) so heinous that it affects not only the family
but society as a whole, the legislature enacted Alaska Statutes
section 11.51.120, which criminalized nonsupport under certain
circumstances." This statute defines the crime of criminal
nonsupport as "fail[ing] without lawful excuse to provide support
for [a] child," the support of whom is that person's legal
responsibility. The statute further defines "support" as including
"necessary food, care, clothing, shelter, medical attention, and
education," and it defines criminal nonsupport as a class A
misdemeanor.73 The statute appears to have been most frequently
used for abuse situations, including failure to obtain medical
services,7' rather than for nonpayment of child support.
An official with the CSED has explained the scarcity of prose-
cutions under the statute as arising from the CSED's primary goal,
which is to recover child support payments, not to incarcerate de-
linquent obligors:
Our experience, at least, in the last five to six years, is that we're
not getting incarceration, and even in criminal nonsupport cases,
that our primary aim is to recover the money, and not to incar-
cerate people, and we wouldn't use this against people that don't
have the assets to pay. If there is any incarceration, it's been for
very short periods of time, and usually within that short period of
time they come up with the money or a substantial part of the
money. Most recently, in 1992, two men spent four days in jail
over a weekend until they could come up with the money,
$10,000 and $10,400 [respectively], (before each) could come
out. And it was a matter of arranging the financing. I don't an-
ticipate realistically that even under the [c]lass A felony that any
judge in the state would sentence someone to a period of incar-
ceration. 75
71. See ALASKA STAT. § 11.51.120 (Michie 1996); see also Moss v. State, 834
P.2d 1256, 1258 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992). The court noted that the principal pur-
pose of civil contempt is to compel compliance, while the purpose of criminal con-
tempt is "primarily to punish an individual for past noncompliance .... [T]he
Court may punish the past willful failure to pay child support by criminal con-
tempt." Id. (citing Diggs v. Diggs, 663 P.2d 950, 951 (Alaska 1983); Johansen v.
State, 491 P.2d 759,763-66 (Alaska 1971)).
72. ALASKA STAT. § 11.51.120.
73. Id. A class A misdemeanor carries a sentence of not more than one year.
ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.135(a) (Michie 1996).
74. See, e.g., S.R.D. v. State, 820 P.2d 1088 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991); State v.
Green, 810 P.2d 1023 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991); Wentz v. State, 777 P.2d 213
(Alaska Ct. App. 1989); Sweetin v. State, 744 P.2d 424 (Alaska Ct. App. 1987).
75. Hearings Before the Alaska House of Representatives Judicial Standing
Comm., 18th Leg., tape 94-58, side B, n.040 (1994) (statement of Phillip Petrie,
Acting Operations Manager, CSED).
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Another official stated that "the division is more focused on deter-
ring the situation than they are on prosecuting [delinquent obli-
gors]."76
Although prosecutions under it appear to have been rare, the
statute has seen occasional use. In Couch v. State," the defendant
was convicted under a plea of no contest to the charge of criminal
nonsupport.78 For ten years the defendant had failed to make
monthly support payments-in disregard of orders from courts of
Alaska and Nevada.79 Because his history suggested he would not
be amenable to probation, the court sentenced him to 180 days
(with ninety suspended) in jail." "[H]is crime was an offense
against the family .... [H]is victims were his own children."81
The lack of prosecutions under Alaska Statutes section
11.51.120 may be attributed to several deficiencies in the section's
language. For example, section 11.51.120 does not identify what
punishment violators will potentially face." Also, the statute does
not explicitly require a particular mens rea; nonetheless the Alaska
Court of Appeals has held that the offense requires proof of a
knowing failure to provide support, accompanied by a reckless dis-
regard for ability to pay." The statute further fails to indicate
whether inability to pay should be an affirmative defense or
whether it should be an element of the crime which must be
proved by the statem Although the statute is triggered when an
obligor "fails ... to provide support,"85 the statute does not indi-
cate what length of time, if any, must pass before a person can be
prosecuted under the statute; nor does it indicate what amount of
arrearage is owed." Finally, the statute fails to differentiate be-
76. Hearings Before the Alaska House Comm. on Health & Human Servs.,
18th Leg., tape 94-61, side B, n.701 (1994) (statement of Mary Gay, Director,
CSED).
77. 795 P.2d 1291 (Alaska Ct. App. 1990).
78. See idU at 1291.
79. See id at 1292.
80. See id
81. Id.
82. See ALASKA STAT. § 11.51.120 (Michie 1996). However, ALASKA STAT. §§
12.55.035-.036 (Michie 1996) provide that the maximum penalty for a class A mis-
demeanor is $5,000 or one year, but not both.
83. See Taylor v. State, 710 P.2d 1019, 1022 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985).
84. Taylor explicitly rejected the interpretation of "without lawful excuse" as
a designation of inability to pay as an affirmative defense; instead, the court chose
to make the state bear the burden of proving a defendant's ability to pay. See id.
at 1021 n.2.
85. ALASKA STAT. § 11.51.120.
86. See id.
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tween possible levels of seriousness under the statute.'
2. Alaska Statutes section 11.51.122. The deficiencies in
section 11.51.120 stand in contrast to Alaska Statutes section
11.51.122," which criminalizes the aiding and abetting of
nonpayment of child support obligations. Before the passage of
this statute, unscrupulous employers could enter into employment
arrangements that would allow noncustodial parents to avoid their
child support obligations by avoiding the wage withholding
requirements of Alaska Statutes section 25.25.305.89 To convict
someone of aiding criminal nonpayment of child support, it must
be proven that, knowing that a noncustodial parent had child
support obligations, a person "intentionally participat[ed] in a
commercial, business, or employment arrangement with the
obligor, knowing at the time that the arrangement is made that it
will allow the obligor to avoid paying all or some of the support."' °
Section 11.51.122 is "targeted at people who deliberately
evade child support by placing assets in someone else's name or
[by] creating companies in someone else's name."'" Indeed, the
Director of the CSED indicated that it was "common practice for
obligors to list their assets under other people's names to avoid
support" obligations.'
The Senate Judiciary Committee first modified the bill to in-
clude subsection (b), which would have provided that it was "not a
defense that the.., defendant did not intend to assist the obligor
in the nonpayment of child support.., or [that the] obligor did not
intend to avoid paying child support."9  Finally, the bill was
amended for the last time by the Senate, which accepted Senator
Donley's proposal that "not" be deleted from subsection (b),
making "lack of intention to assist," a defense.4
Unlike section 11.51.120, Alaska Statutes section 11.51.122 has
87. See id.
88. Id. § 11.51.122.
89. Id. § 25.25.305.
90. Id. § 11.51.122(a)(2)(B). This statute also allows for conviction of a per-
son who "intentionally withhold[s] information about the residence or employ-
ment of the obligor when that information is requested by a child support en-
forcement agency." Id. § 11.51.122(a)(2)(A).
91. Hearings Before the Alaska House Comm. on Health & Human Servs.,
tape 94-61, side B, n.055 (1994) (statement of Phillip Petrie, Acting Operations
Manager, CSED).
92. Id., n.675 (1994) (statement of Mary Gay, Director, CSED).
93. Senate Journal, 18th Leg., 2d Sess. 4220 (May 2, 1994); see H.R. 362, 18th
Leg., 2d Sess. (Alaska 1994).
94. Senate Journal, 18th Leg., 2d Sess. 4674 (May 10, 1994); see H.R. 362, 18th
Leg., 2d Sess. (Alaska 1994).
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several strengths, including the clear identification of potential
penalties, a clear statement of the required mens rea and a clear
requirement that thirty days must pass before the statute is trig-
gered.95
3. Recommendations for amendments that would strengthen
and clarify Alaska Statutes section 11.51.120. Prosecutions seem to
be rarely pursued under section 11.51.120. As discussed above,
this scarcity of prosecutions could perhaps be attributed to the
section's deficiencies. Although the Alaska Court of Appeals has
held that section 11.51.120 is not impermissibly vague,96 the statute
would become clearer were these deficiencies addressed. By
examining Alaska case law as well as the statutes of several other
states that criminalize the nonpayment of child support
obligations, this Note will make various suggestions about how
Alaska could make its statute stronger.
a. The statute should explicitly state that it applies to
nonpayment of child support. In Taylor v. State,7 the court of
appeals interpreted section 11.51.120 broadly to apply to
nonpayment of child support." The court declined to delineate the
parameters of "support" under section 11.51.120, holding merely
that "in criminal nonsupport prosecutions under [section]
11.51.120, proof of failure to make court-ordered support
payments will, at the very least, suffice to establish a prima facie
case of nonsupport." 99 If the legislature were to include explicit
statutory language indicating that the statute applies to court-
ordered support payments, the improved clarity might have a
greater deterrent effect on obligors. In addition, as the statute is
currently written, it could be interpreted to apply to noncustodial
parents who have no court-ordered child support obligations and
who do not contribute to the support of their children. The
problem with such an application is that the statute gives no
indication when and under what circumstances such parents would
become liable. As the court of appeals noted in Olp v. State,'00
"there is a real risk that were we to interpret the statute [in the
suggested manner], the statute would become void for
vagueness. '  To avoid possibly questionable applications of the
95. See ALASKA STAT. § 11.51.122.
96. See Taylor v. State, 710 P.2d 1019, 1023 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985) (holding
that the statute affords adequate notice of the conduct it prohibits).
97. 710 P.2d 1019 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985).
98. See id. at 1022.
99. Id.
100. 738 P.2d 1117 (Alaska Ct. App. 1987).
101. Id. at 1119 (refusing to apply section 11.51.120 to stepparents).
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statute while encouraging applications which are within the
contemplation of the legislature, section 11.51.120 should be
amended to indicate explicitly what types of nonpayment of child
support it covers.
b. The statute should be divided into graduated levels of
offenses with corresponding levels of punishment. Alaska Statutes
section 11.51.120(c) currently defines the violation of a parent's
legal responsibility to provide support for a child as a class A
misdemeanor1 O No distinction is made between a past due
amount of $50 and $50,000; under the terms of the statute, both
amounts could subject obligors to a misdemeanor violation. While
this might be an adequate deterrent for an obligor whose arrearage
is only a few thousand dollars, it might be too severe a punishment
for someone with a small arrearage, and it would certainly be too
lenient for repeat or flagrant offenders. The Alaska legislature
should consider instituting a graduated scale, so that offenders will
face punishment commensurate with their deeds. In formulating
such a scale, the laws of other states ought to be examined.
Several states penalize failure to pay child support according
to a graduated scale, with first-time offenders punished as misde-
meanants and repeat or flagrant offenders punished as felons.'°3
Furthermore, some states have graduated levels within the misde-
meanor and felony categories.1  The basis for the gradations is
usually one of the following: (1) the amount of unpaid child sup-
port equals a floor monetary figure;0 5 (2) the amount of unpaid
child support equals a certain number of monthly support obliga-
tions (for example, six months worth of unpaid support); (3) during
a specific period of time, the parent has failed to pay a particular
number of payments (for example, six payments during the pre-
ceding twelve months); or (4) some combination of the previous
possibilities (for example, the greater of $2000 or six times the
monthly support obligation).' 6 In addition, several states heighten
the level of offense from a misdemeanor to a felony if a person
leaves the state for the purpose of evading child support obliga-
102. See ALASKA STAT. 11.51.120(c) (Michie 1996). An obligor convicted of a
class A misdemeanor may be sentenced to a "definite term of imprisonment of
not more than one year." Id. § 12.55.135(a).
103. See, e.g., KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 530.050 (Banks-Baldwin 1995); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 39-15-101 (1991). The Model Penal Code takes a more lenient ap-
proach, suggesting merely a misdemeanor for a person who persistently fails to
provide support. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.5 (1962).
104. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-37-01 (Supp. 1995).
105. See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAws § 11-2-1.1(a) (Supp. 1995) (punishing arrearages
of past due support in the amount of $30,000 as a felony).
106. See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 568.040(4) (West Supp. 1997).
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tions.1°7 These provisions generally have neither a monetary
threshold requirement nor a requirement of a prior offense."5
In formulating a graduated statutory scale, the Alaska legisla-
ture could also look to previous bills that it has considered in this
area. In the original version of the House Bill for Alaska Statutes
section 11.51.122,9 which criminalizes the aid of nonpayment of
child support, Representative Martin's proposal included grada-
tions of the severity of the offense. Each level would have re-
quired the child support payment to be past due by thirty days, but
the bill set up specific distinctions according to the amount of sup-
port due: (1) a class B misdemeanor if less than $1000 were due;(2) a class A misdemeanor if between $1000 and $5000 were due;
and (3) a class C felony if at least $5000 were due.1 During com-
mittee meetings in the Alaska House of Representatives, many
legislators remarked on the discrepancy between the penalties
provided by section 11.51.120 and those that were proposed in
House Bill 362."' The representatives were in general agreement
that it would be improper to punish nonpayment of child support
as a class A misdemeanor while punishing aiding nonpayment of
child support as a class C felony, and members of the Health, Edu-
cation and Social Services committee expressed an interest in
having the punishment for nonpayment of child support raised to a
class C felony.11
2
c. The statute should specify the required state of mind for the
107. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 19-10-1(b) (1991) (making this offense a felony
but providing that the first two convictions for this offense are reducible to a mis-
demeanor); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 852B (West Supp. 1994) (making fleeing
the state for this purpose a felony punishable by up to 4 years imprisonment, a
fine of $5000, or both); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-7-16 (Michie Supp. 1996)
(making it a felony for a parent to leave the state during a violation and remain
absent for more than 30 days).
108. For example, Montana recognizes the offense of "aggravated nonsup-
port," which occurs when a person either (a) has been previously convicted of
nonsupport or (b) "has left the state without making reasonable provisions" for
support. MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-621(2)(a) (1995). The penalty for this offense
is a fine not to exceed $50,000, imprisonment not to exceed 10 years, or both. See
id. § 45-5-621(7)(c).
109. H.R. 362, 18th Leg., 2d Sess. (Alaska 1994).
110. See id. However, at the suggestion of Representative Brown, House
Journal, 18th Leg., 2d Sess. 3427 (Apr. 14, 1994), the penalty was changed to a
class A misdemeanor, and all gradations were removed. See H.R. 362.
111. See Hearings Before the Alaska House Comm. on Health, Educ. & Social
Servs., 18th Leg., tape 94-61, side B, nn.234-591 (1994) (statement of Phillip
Petrie, Acting Operations Manager, CSED).
112. See id.
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criminal nonsupport statute. In Taylor v. State, the court held that
because the statute "does not specify any culpable mental state,"
the default levels of criminal intent of Alaska Statutes section
11.81.610(b) should be applied-"knowingly" for conduct and
"recklessly" for results.' The court held that application of
Alaska Statutes section 11.81.610(b) "leads to the conclusion that
the offense of criminal nonsupport requires proof of a knowing
failure to provide support, accompanied by a reckless disregard for
ability to pay.""14 Because the level of criminal intent adopted in
Taylor might not properly reflect the desire of the legislature if
they were to amend the statute and adopt some of the
recommendations included in this Note, the legislature should give
special consideration to the applicable culpable mental state.
Again, an examination of laws from other states proves help-
ful. Briefly, the mental state required under other state statutes
varies. While some require willfulness or intent,"* others require
only knowledge."6 A few states' statutes even allow conviction
upon a theory of negligence.
117
d. The statute should be amended to indicate that inability to
pay is an affirmative defense. Almost all states with criminal
penalties for failure to pay child support also provide an
affirmative defense of inability to pay."" Proof of this defense
requires more than merely being out of work at the moment,
however. For example, a Wisconsin statute criminalizing failure to
pay child support obligations states that "a person may not
demonstrate inability to provide child... support if the person is
employable but, without reasonable excuse, either fails to
diligently seek employment, terminates employment or reduces his
113. Taylor v. State, 710 P.2d 1019, 1022 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985) (citing
ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.610(b) (Michie 1996)).
114. Id.
115. See, e.g., MASS. ANN. LAWs ch. 273, § 1(4) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1996); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 25-7-16 (Michie Supp. 1996).
116. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.375(1) (West Supp. 1997); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 568.040(a) (West Supp. 1997); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-621(1) (1995).
117. Connecticut allows conviction of "any person who neglects or refuses to
furnish reasonably necessary support." CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-304(a) (West
Supp. 1994). On the other hand, Nebraska seems to have a mixed mens rea re-
quirement. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-706 (1995). Under this statute, a person is
guilty of criminal nonsupport if he or she "intentionally fails, refuses, or neglects
to provide proper support which he or she knows or reasonably should know he
or she is legally obligated to provide." I&L
118. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-6-101(1) (Supp. 1996); IND. CODE
ANN. § 35-46-1-5(d) (Michie Supp. 1996).
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or her earnings or assets."1 9 Texas' definition of inability to pay
reaches beyond employability, providing in pertinent part:
An obligor may plead as an affirmative defense.., that the obli-
gor:
(1) lacked the ability to provide support in the amount or-
dered;
(2) lacked property that could be sold, mortgaged, or oth-
erwise pledged to raise the funds needed;
(3) attempted unsuccessfully to borrow the funds needed;
and
(4) knew of no source from which the money could have
been borrowed or legally obtained.'20
As an affirmative defense, the burden of proof usually rests with
the parent seeking child support.
121
As it is currently written, Alaska Statutes section 11.51.120
fails to indicate whether inability to pay should be an affirmative
defense or whether it should be an element of the crime that must
be proved by the state. However, in Taylor v. State, the Alaska
Court of Appeals held that the state must bear the burden of
proving a defendant's inability to pay.' Because this decision was
based on statutory interpretation and was not a reflection of any
constitutional requirement, the legislature could change the statute
without constitutional effects. Therefore, if it were to amend the
statute, the legislature may designate who is to bear the burden of
proof. Prosecution under this statute would be considerably easier
if inability to pay were an affirmative defense. After all, a defen-
dant under this section is in the best position to know about alter-
native financial means that could be used to meet the child support
obligation.
B. Federal Criminal Provisions
Under the Child Support Recovery Act of 1992"3 ("CSRA")
Congress has criminalized the "willful[] fail[ure] to pay a past due
support obligation with respect to a child who resides in another
[s]tate."" Much like many of the state statutes examined above,
this statute has graduated levels of offenses and a threshold re-
quirement. While the punishment for a first offense is a fine or im-
prisonment for not more than six months (or both), for "any other
case" the punishment is a fine or imprisonment for not more than
119. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 948.22(6) (West 1996).
120. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 157.008(c) (West 1996).
121. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. § 948.22(6) (West 1996).
122. See Taylor v. State, 710 P.2d 1019, 1021 & n.2 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985).
123. 18 U.S.C. § 228 (1994).
124. Id.. § 228(a).
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two years (or both).'s The past due support obligation also must
have "remained unpaid for a period longer than one year" or be
"greater than $5,000.''1' However, even if these requirements are
met, prosecution is not automatic. Despite the fact that the Justice
Department recently staged a high visibility campaign to intimi-
date violators of the CSRA, the overwhelming nature of the prob-
lem prevents the government from taking action directly on com-
plaints from most victims. m Instead, "because this remedy is
reserved for only the most egregious cases," a custodial parent
must exhaust "all reasonable available remedies" at the state level
before prosecution will be undertaken."'
At the present time, no CSRA cases have been brought in the
district of Alaska, and only a few cases have been heard in the
Ninth Circuit. Because the arguments made for and against the
constitutionality of the CSRA have been thoroughly examined in
many recent law review articles,29 this Note will not examine them
here. Nevertheless, it will briefly mention the Ninth Circuit's spe-
cific holdings.
In United States v. Mussarif3° and its companion case United
States v. Schroeder,131 the District Court of Arizona declared the
CSRA unconstitutional . The court invalidated the statute on
several grounds: (1) the CSRA is a "criminal statute aimed at an
area of activity which has already been addressed by the [s]tates"
125. IL § 228(b).
126. Id. § 228(d)(1)(B).
127. See DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, DEADBEAT DAD ENFORCEMENT: DOJ ON
TIGHTROPE 5 (1995).
128. OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, supra note 56.
129. See, e.g.,Cindy Boer, Comment, The New and "Improved" Commerce
Power C Can the Federal Child Support Recovery Act Survive Lopez?, 13 COOLEY
L. REV. 677 (1996); Kathleen A. Burdette, Comment, Making Parents Pay: Inter-
state Child Support Enforcement After United States v. Lopez, 144 U. PA. L. REV.
1469 (1996); Ronald S. Kornreich, Note, The Constitutionality of Punishing Dead-
beat Parents: The Child Support Recovery Act of 1992 After United States v.
Lopez, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1089 (1995); Dawn L. Rudenko, Note, Child Sup-
port Recovery Act: Unification or Usurpation? The CSRA in the Aftermath of
United States v. Lopez, 31 NEw ENG. L. REv.267 (1996); Amy E. Watkins,
Comment, The Child Support Recovery Act of 1992: Squeezing Blood from a
Stone, 6 SETON HALL CONST. L. J. 845 (1996); Rebecca A. Wistner, Comment,
Abusing the Power to Regulate: The Child Support Recovery Act of 1992, 46 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 935 (1996).
130. 894 F. Supp. 1360 (D. Ariz. 1995), rev'd, 95 F.3d 787 (9th Cir. 1996).
131. 894 F. Supp. 360 (D. Ariz. 1995), rev'd sub nom. United States v. Mussari,
95 F.3d 787 (9th Cir. 1996).
132. See Mussari, 894 F. Supp. at 1361. Schroeder and Mussari were both writ-
ten by Judge Rosenblatt; except for the background facts, the two opinions are
identical. For simplicity, this Note will cite only to Mussari.
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and therefore it cannot be sustained as a regulation of an activity
that substantially affects interstate commerce;"' (2) the CSRA
violates notions of federalism and comity by requiring federal
courts to review and apply state orders;'m' and (3) "[b]ecause the
CSRA is an exercise of powers beyond those given to Congress by
the Constitution, the CSRA infringes upon those powers reserved
for the [s]tates by the Tenth Amendment."1 35 On a motion for re-
consideration, the district court further ruled that the CSRA could
not be upheld as a valid exercise of Commerce Clause authority
because it failed to establish that interstate commerce existed. Y6
The district court also implied that because the "true focal point..
. [of the CSRA] is clearly the requirement that the parent and
child live in different states," w the CSRA was in reality an attempt
by Congress to create diversity jurisdiction in a child support mat-
ter, in disregard of the domestic relations exception to the use of
diversity jurisdiction.38
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district
court,139 holding that (1) the CSRA was a constitutional exercise of
Congress's power under the Commerce Clause as a regulation of
the channels of interstate commerce, 40 (2) the CSRA did not vio-
late the Tenth Amendment reservation of state powers because
Congress acted under one of its enumerated powers,'41 and (3) the
domestic relations exception has no application here because this
is not "a case of jurisdiction based on diversity but [a case of] juris-
diction conferred by congressional employment of congressional
power under the Commerce Clause." 142
The court of appeals's decision in United States v. Mussari is
clearly in accord with the weight of authority.143 Because the stat-
133. Id. at 1364.
134. See id. at 1367.
135. Id. at 1368.
136. See id. at 1253-55.
137. Id. at 1254.
138. See id. at 1254-55 (citing Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 703
(1992) ("[T]he domestic relations exception . . . divests the federal courts of
power to issue divorce, alimony, and child custody decrees." )).
139. See Mussari, 95 F.3d 787, rev'g, 894 F. Supp. 1360 and United States v.
Schroeder, 894 F. Supp. 360 (D. Ariz. 1995).
140. See id. at 790.
141. See id. at 791.
142 Id.
143. Other than the lower court decisions in Mussari and Schroeder, only one
other case has held the CSRA unconstitutional: United States v. Bailey, 902 F.
Supp. 727 (W.D. Tex. 1995). In contrast, at least 15 other cases have upheld the
constitutionality of the CSRA. See, e.g., United States v. Lewis, 936 F. Supp. 1093
(D.R.I. 1996); United States v. Ganaposki, 930 F. Supp. 1076 (M.D. Tenn. 1996);
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ute has withstood multiple constitutional challenges, it is likely that
enforcement of the CSRA in Alaska will be held constitutionally
valid.
C. General Weaknesses of the State and Federal Criminal
Statutes
Although it is not clear precisely why prosecutions are rarely
pursued under the statutes criminalizing the nonpayment of child
support and the aid of nonpayment of child support, there are a
few possible explanations. The most obvious explanation is the
difficulty of proving these crimes "beyond a reasonable doubt."
Administrative provisions, such as those discussed in Part II, or the
license revocation, denial and suspension provisions examined in
the next part, are perhaps less burdensome to enforce and can be
undertaken on a larger scale. In addition, Alaska Statutes section
11.51.120 (punishing the nonpayment of child support) is too broad
to be an effective tool in the arsenal of child support enforcement
provisions. Finally, the CSRA is limited only to those families in
which the delinquent obligor resides in a different state from his or
her children. While a large number of families fit this description,
the majority of child support cases in Alaska do not. Despite the
relative under-enforcement of these statutes, Alaska has consid-
ered (and enacted) other enforcement provisions that will allow it
to meet the twin goals of the criminal statutes, namely making
enough deadbeat parents feel the pinch of enforcement and in-
creasing child support collections. Included in these new statutes
are provisions that require the revocation, suspension or denial of
licenses of delinquent obligors.
IV. REVOCATION, SUSPENSION OR DENIAL OF LICENSES
The most recent, and perhaps the most controversial, change
in Alaska's child support enforcement provisions is the enactment
of legislation in 1996 that threatens to hit delinquent parents in a
most sensitive area by revoking their driver's and occupational li-
censes. Specifically, Alaska Statutes section 25.27.244' requires
licensing agencies to restrict the issuance and renewal of occupa-
tional and professional licenses of child support obligors who are
United States v. Nichols, 928 F. Supp. 302 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); United States v. John-
son, 940 F. Supp. 911 (E.D.Va. 1996); United States v. Sage, 906 F. Supp. 84 (D.
Conn. 1995), afjd, 92 F.3d 101 (2d Cir. 1996); United States v. Hampshire, 892 F.
Supp. 1327 (D. Kan. 1995), affd, 95 F.3d 999 (10th Cir. 1996); United States v.
Murphy, 893 F. Supp. 614 (W.D. Va. 1995), vacated on other grounds, 934 F.
Supp. 736 (W.D. Va. 1996).
144. ALASKA STAT. § 25.27.244 (Michie 1996).
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not in "substantial compliance" with their child support order. 45
Alaska Statutes section 25.27.246'4' uses the same "substantial
compliance" standard to allow suspension and revocation of
driver's licenses.1 47 Although the statutes are very similar in con-
tent and form, there are important distinctions between them.
Under the terms of section 25.27.244, every month the CSED
must create a list of all obligors who are not in substantial compli-
ance148 and forward the list to all licensing entities subject to the
statute.4 9 Before placing an obligor on the list, the CSED must
give him or her at least sixty days written notice of the arrear-
ages. 50 This section takes no action against delinquent obligors
who currently hold occupational licenses; however, it affects delin-
quent obligors who apply to a licensing entity for issuance or re-
newal of an occupational license, and the entities "may not issue or
renew" a license for a person on the list until the entity receives a
release from the CSED. 5' After receiving an application for an
occupational license, the licensing entity must (1) notify the appli-
cant of the licensing entity's intention to withhold issuance or re-
newal of the license'52 and (2) issue a temporary license valid for
150 days to applicants who are otherwise eligible for a license."3
Under the terms of section 25.27.246, the CSED must create
"a list of obligors who have a driver's license and are not in sub-
stantial compliance," and it must give the obligor at least 60 days
written notice of his or her arrearages before placing an obligor on
the list.'-" The CSED must also serve notice to each person on the
list that the "driver's license will be suspended in 150 days, and will
not be reissued or renewed the next time it is applied for... unless
the licensee receives a release from the agency.""' This statute has
a much different effect from the statute relating to occupational
licensure. On the one hand, it calls for suspension of existing li-
censes, unlike section 25.27.244. On the other hand, section
145. Id. § 25.27.244(b). "Substantial compliance" is defined as having either
"no arrearage or... an arrearage in an amount that is not more than four times
the monthly obligation under the support order or payment schedule." Id. §
25.27.244(q)(6).
146. Id. § 25.27.246.
147. See id. § 25.27.246(c). The definition of "substantial compliance" in sec-
tion 25.27.246(n)(5) is the same as in section 25.27.244(q)(6).
148. See id. § 25.27.244(a).
149. See id. § 25.27.244(b).
150. See id. § 25.27.244(a).
151. Id. § 25.27.244(b).
152. See id. § 25.27.244(c).
153. See id. § 25.27.244(d).
154. Id. § 25.27.246(a).
155. Id. § 25.27.246(b).
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25.27.246 applies only to obligors who already have a driver's li-
cense; it does not apply to obligors who have yet to apply for a
driver's license, while section 25.27.244 applies to all obligors.
Under the terms of both statutes, licensing entities will issue
or renew licenses only after receiving a release from the CSED.
Such a release must be issued in any one of the following situa-
tions: (1) if the applicant is found to be in substantial compliance
with his or her support orders or if the applicant has negotiated an
agreement with the CSED for a payment schedule on arrearages;
(2) if the applicant submits a timely request for review to the divi-
sion or a judicial request for review, but the request will not be re-
viewed within the 150-day grace period; or (3) if the applicant has
obtained a judicial finding of substantial compliance.56
Section 25.27.244 specifically includes the following occupa-
tional "licens[es], certificate[s], permit[s], registration[s], [and]
other authorization[s]":' (1) boxing or wrestling licenses; (2) li-
censes required for occupations regulated under Alaska Statutes
section 08 (which includes certified public accountants, physicians,
nurses, dentists, veterinarians, social workers, barbers and hair-
dressers, real estate brokers and appraisers, architects, marine pi-
lots, morticians and hunting guides); (3) teacher certificate; (4)
emergency medical services authorization; (5) asbestos worker cer-
tification; (6) boiler operator's license; (7) certificate of fitness to
engage in electrical wiring or plumbing; (8) hazardous painting cer-
tification; (9) security guard license; (10) insurance license; (11)
employment agency permit; (12) broker-dealer, agent or invest-
ment adviser registration; (13) pesticide applicator certification;
(14) storage tank worker or contractor certification; and (15) water
and wastewater works operator certification.'58 It specifically ex-
cludes (1) commercial fishing licenses, (2) vessel licenses, (3) li-
censes required to operate child care facilities, (4) business licenses
issued under Alaska Statutes section 43.70.. (required for taxation
purposes), (5) entry permits or interim-use permits and (6) driver's
licenses."
156. See id. §§ 25.27.244(g), 25.27.246(f).
157. Id § 25.27.244(q)(2)(A).
158. See id.
159. See id. § 43.70; see also Op. Alaska Att'y Gen. No. 3. (1959) ("The statute
is a tax statute. It has no regulatory features and is not designed to limit the doing
of business in Alaska on the basis of any determination of the fitness of the per-
son subject to the tax to engage in his business or profession.").
160. See ALAsKA STAT. § 25.26.246(q)(1)(B) (Michie 1996). This applies to
licenses issued under Alaska Statutes section 28.15: basic driver's licenses and
school bus licenses. See id. § 28.15. Commercial driver's licenses are issued under
a different subsection. See id. § 28.33.100.
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Alaska is not the first state to consider enacting statutes that
require adverse action against delinquent obligor's licenses. In-
deed, twenty-eight states have enacted statutes that require or al-
low revocation, suspension or denial of licenses for those who are
delinquent in child support payments. Roughly one quarter of
these states provide for the revocation, suspension or denial of
driver's licenses;... and another quarter provide for the revocation,
suspension or denial of occupational or professional licenses."'
Almost half of those states that have enacted statutes in this area
provide for a combination of revocation, suspension or denial of
driver's, professional or occupational licenses."3 In addition, a
handful of states provide for the revocation, suspension or denial
of recreational licenses, including hunting and fishing.1
A recent review of state license revocation programs by the
Department of Health and Human Services ("HHS") indicates
that this enforcement method is quite successful.165 HHS estimates
that license revocation could increase total child support collec-
tions by as much as $2.5 billion over the next ten years.'66 In 1987,
officials in South Dakota estimated that child support collections
increased by $5 million since the implementation of its license sus-
pension statute two years before." In addition, approximately
4,000 repayment agreements had been reached with delinquent
obligors, while only seven driver's licenses had been revoked.
Maine's license suspension statute has proven to be similarly
successful. Less than two years after its statute was enacted, more
161. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 26-13-123 (1996); 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/7-
702 (West Supp. 1996); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 186.570 (Banks-Baldwin Supp.
1996); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-08.1-07 (Supp. 1995); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 31-2-23
(Supp. 1996).
162. See, e.g., ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-2452 (West 1994); Iowa CODE ANN.
§ 598.23A (West 1996); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 74-147 (SUPp. 1996); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§§ 40-5A-1 to 40-5A-13 (Michie Supp. 1996); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 795 (Supp.
1996).
163. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 11350.6 (West Supp. 1997); MINN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 171.186 (West Supp. 1997), 214.101 (West 1992); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 110-142.1, 110-142.2 (1995); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 2301.373, 2301.374
(Banks-Baldwin Supp. 1997); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 139.1 (West Supp.
1997).
164. See, e.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 119A, § 16 (Law. Co-op. 1994); TEx. FAM.
CODE ANN. §§ 232.001-.016 (West 1996).
165. See Dept. of Health and Human Services, Child Support Report (Mar.
1995) <http:lwww.acf.dhhs.gov/ACFPrograms/CSE/new/csr9503.html#9503d>.
166. See id.
167. See id., (Nov. 1995) <http:llwww.acf.dhhs.govlACFPrograms/CSE/new/
csr9511.html#9511a>.
168. See id.
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than $25 million in child support had already been paid by delin-
quent obligors who were sent letters warning of impending suspen-
sion of their licenses if they did not pay.169
Alaska was required to pass such laws by a recent public law
passed by the United States Congress. Section 369 of the Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of
1996170 requires states to have in effect procedures that would give
the state authority to withhold or suspend the licenses of individu-
als owing overdue support."'
Although the Alaska Statutes sections requiring adverse ac-
tion against delinquent obligor's licenses have not been in effect
very long, they will undoubtedly be subject to future constitutional
challenges. These challenges will likely include the following: (1) a
substantive due process argument that the state's interest in col-
lecting child support is not sufficiently compelling to overcome the
individual's interest in supporting a family by procuring or main-
taining an occupational or professional license; (2) a procedural
due process argument that the statute deprives individuals of their
licenses without providing constitutionally adequate procedures
under the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; and
(3) an argument that the inclusion of certain types of occupational
licenses and the exclusion of others violates the Equal Protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. "
A. Substantive Due Process Argument
If Alaska Statutes sections 25.27.244 and 25.27.246 are
deemed to infringe on a fundamental right, such as freedom in
family relationships, courts will rigorously scrutinize the state's de-
nial of issuance or renewal of an occupational license or the sus-
pension of a driver's license.' If the statutes are deemed to im-
pact a lesser right, such as the economic interest in the right to
169. See id., (Apr. 1995) <http://www.acf.dhhs.govlACFProgramslCSE/newl
csr9504.html#9504a>.
170. Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 369, 110 Stat. 2105, 2251 (1996) (amending 42
U.S.C.A. § 666 (a)(16) (West Supp. 1997)).
171. The bill applies to driver's licenses, professional licenses, and recreational
licenses. See id.
172. For a good analysis of these and other constitutional issues raised by an
Arizona licensure suspension statute, see Susan Nicholas, Note, Collecting Child
Support From Delinquent Parents: A Constitutional Analysis of An Arizona En-
forcement Mechanism, 34 ARIz. L. REV. 163 (1992).
173. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (holding unconstitu-
tional a statute that prevented noncustodial fathers who owed child support from
marrying); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1971) (declaring
unconstitutional a city housing ordinance that infringed on the interest of
"freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life").
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work, courts will apply a more deferential level of scrutiny under
the rational basis test. 7
At first glance, the interest affected by denial of an occupa-
tional license seems to be economic. It would result in an individ-
ual's inability to work in a particular field. However, taken one
step further, the inability to work might prevent an individual from
supporting a current family as well as preventing him from meeting
his child support obligations. Thus, one could argue that the denial
of an occupational license interferes with family relationships, an
area protected by the United States Constitution, and thus de-
mands strict scrutiny. Similarly, one could argue that the denial of
a driver's license could so hamper an individual's ability to travel
to work that he or she would be prevented from supporting a fam-
ily or meeting child support obligations.
Closer analysis reveals the weakness of these arguments.
There should be no disruption of the obligor's ability to work, be-
cause a temporary license is issued immediately to obligors who
are otherwise eligible for the issuance or renewal of an occupa-
tional license."5 Similarly, there should be no disruption of an ob-
ligor's ability to drive, because there is no suspension of driver's
licenses before 150 days have passed from the time notice is given
to the obligor."6 During the 150 days following notice under the
statutes, the obligors can do one of several things: (1) come into
substantial compliance with their child support orders; (2) enter
into a payment agreement with CSED, or; (3) obtain a modifica-
tion of support order.'7 By following one of these three options,
even obligors who are financially unable to meet their child sup-
port obligations can avoid denial of an occupational license or sus-
pension of their driver's license. Of course, it is the obligor's re-
sponsibility to act with diligence in following one of these
options.'78 Since the denial of an occupational license under sec-
tion 25.27.244 or the suspension or revocation of a driver's license
under section 25.27.246 does not necessarily result in the loss of a
job, there is no reason for these sections to be viewed as affecting
family relationships in an improper manner. Therefore, the ra-
tional basis test would apply.
For a statute to withstand challenge under the rational basis
test, there must be a rational connection between the legislation
174. See, e.g., Barsky v. Board of Regents, 347 U.S. 442 (1954) (upholding the
suspension of a physician's license).
175. See ALASKA STAT. § 25.27.244(q)(2)(A) (Michie 1996).
176. See ALASKA STAT. § 25.27.246(b) (Michie 1996).
177. See id.
178. See id.
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and the government's purpose.179 The strongest challenge to the
rationality of any connection between license suspension or denial
is that sections 25.27.244 and 25.27.246 do not regulate on the basis
of occupational competence or driving ability. Instead, they seem
to regulate licenses based upon an individual's ability or willing-
ness to meet the financial and moral obligations of child support.
Although legislatures have broad discretion to regulate many ac-
tivities and occupations, a state's regulatory power is generally
limited by the requirement that the regulations have a rational ba-
sis.1 s Most regulatory provisions in this area are based on the ra-
tionale "that the public is exposed to an unacceptable risk of harm
if the activity or occupation is performed incompetently, reck-
lessly, dishonestly, or with intent to injure.""1 ' While the courts
have acknowledged that "the government possesses the power to
revoke the license of someone whose conduct demonstrates his or
her unfitness to continue in that activity or occupation,""" it is un-
clear whether this governmental power includes the power of sus-
pension or denial of driver's and occupational licenses for failure
to pay child support.
In the only federal case that has examined the issue,
Thompson v. Ellenbecker,n three individuals brought a constitu-
tional challenge to South Dakota statutes sections 32-12-116 and
25-7A-56,"' which restrict the issuance or renewal of driver's and
professional licenses to anyone owing more than $1,000 in child
support arrearages.' The district court held that the plaintiffs did
not have standing to challenge section 25-7A-56, "because none of
the plaintiffs have the type of professional or business license sub-
ject to restriction under the statute."'8 6 Since the plaintiffs all had
driver's licenses and section 32-12-116 had been applied to deny
the renewal of their driving permits, the court held that the plain-
tiffs did have standing to challenge the constitutionality of the
statute restricting the renewal or issuance of driver's licenses."s
179. See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 83, 84
(1978).
180. See Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 239 (1957) ("A
state can require high standards of qualification, such as good moral character or
proficiency... [,] but any qualification must have a rational connection with the
applicant's fitness or capacity to practice.").
181. State v. Zerkel, 900 P.2d 744,753 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995).
182. Id.
183. 935 F. Supp. 1037 (D.S.D. 1995).
184. S.D. CODIFIED LAWs §§ 25-7A-56, 32-12-116 (Michie 1995).
185. See Thompson, 35 F. Supp. at 1038.
186. Id at 1039.
187. See id. The plaintiffs each received temporary driver's licenses pending
the resolution of the case. See id at 1038.
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The court began by noting that "[t]he statute at issue is pre-
sumed constitutional as it does not involve suspect classifications
or fundamental rights," " and the plaintiffs therefore had the bur-
den of proving that the statute had no rational basis. The plaintiffs
argued that "it is arbitrary and irrational to restrict an individual's
driver's license for conduct unrelated to that individual's ability to
safely operate a motor vehicle."189 The state countered this asser-
tion, arguing that "a rational basis exists between nonpayment of
child support and restriction on the obligor's license to drive" for
the following reasons:
When an obligor is more than $1,000 in arrears for child support,
the state is able to ascertain an obligor's current address when he
or she seeks to renew his or her drivers license. Additionally, re-
strictions on one's ability to drive inhibits one's ability to move
from job-to-job, state-to-state or location-to-location. Without a
valid drivers license[,] it is more difficult to move or change obs
with the specific intent of avoiding payment of child support.
Persuaded that these reasons rationally supported the restrictions
on the child support obligors' driver's licenses, the court held that
the statute does not deny substantive due process. 191
As discussed in a recent law review note by Susan Nicholas, at
least one state court has examined the constitutionality of a statute
restricting the occupational license of a delinquent obligor1 9
Nicholas notes that an Arizona superior court ordered the profes-
sional license of a psychologist suspended for failure to pay child
support, finding that
[t]he failure of a professional to financially support his or her
child clearly demonstrates ... a lack of appropriate character
and fitness of the subject professional. If a professional is in-
clined to financially abandon her own flesh and blood, it is not
unrealistic to assume that this same professional would turn
away from her own client for little or no justification.19
If the Alaska courts adopt the reasoning outlined in these
cases, then sections 25.27.244 and 25.27.246 will probably be found
to be a reasonable regulatory mechanism. However, it is not clear
that such an attenuated argument will find favor with Alaska
courts. These statutes clearly do not regulate on the basis of occu-
pational competence or driving ability. Instead they regulate li-
censes based upon an individual's ability or willingness to meet a
188. Id. at 1040 (citing MSM Farms v. Spire, 927 F.2d 330,332 (8th Cir. 1991)).
189. Id.
190. Id. at 1040.
191. See id.
192- See Nicholas, supra note 172 (analyzing Flores v. Board of Psych. Exam'rs,
No. CV 90-33689 (Ariz. Super. Ct. Apr. 24, 1991) (slip op.)).
193. Id at 183 (quoting Flores, No. CV 90-33689, at 34).
[Vol. 14:1
CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT
financial or moral obligation.
Consideration of the "unexpected consequences [which may
result] from the implementation" '194 of these statutes may lead the
Alaska Supreme Court to reject the analysis in Thompson v. El-
lenbecker and Flores v. Board of Psychological Examiners. The
Attorney General noted the following problems that "will need to
be addressed.., so that they do not create insurmountable legal or
practical problems":. 5
[T]he denial of a license may have an impact beyond its affect on
the delinquent obligor. For example, the denial of a license may
adversely impact an insurance firm if the obligor is the compli-
ance officer or the principal for a firm. Without the required in-
dividual licensee, the firm's license may be in jeopardy, leading
to ... adverse impacts ... that could extend to closure of the
business. Small rural communities may be affected ... if the
community's only certified wastewater plant operator has his or
her certification revoked. Some remote communities may be left
in difficult circumstances if the EMT's license is revoked or de-
nied and there are no other local candidates for EMT licensure
within a community.9 6
Overall, it is not clear whether the Alaska courts will find sections
25.27.244 and 25.27.246 constitutional under a rational basis test
for a substantive due process challenge.
B. Procedural Due Process Arguments
Of the three potential challenges to a statute requiring the
suspension of a driver's license or the denial of the issuance or re-
newal of an occupational license listed above, a challenge on the
basis of procedural due process will probably be the easiest to
overcome. The United States Supreme Court and the Alaska Su-
preme Court have both classified a driver's license as an important
property interest, requiring that the state grant a hearing to a
driver before his license is revoked.'9 Sections 25.27.244 and
25.27.246 mandate that all applicants who will be denied issuance
or renewal of occupational licenses and all drivers whose licenses
will be suspended be given notice.' Licensees and applicants may
challenge their impending suspension or denial of renewal or issu-
ance by making a written request for review.' The statutes also
194. Op. Alaska Att'y Gen. No. 883-95-0078 (June 15, 1995).
195. Id
196. Id
197. See Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971); State v. Zerkel, 900 P.2d 744,
751-52 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995) (citing Graham v. State, 633 P.2d 211, 216 (Alaska
1981)).
198. See ALAsKA STAT. §§ 25.27.244(c), 25.27.246(b) (Michie 1996).
199. See id. §§ 25.27.244(e), 25.27.246(d).
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provide review procedures allowing applicants and licensees "to
have the underlying arrearages and relevant defenses investi-
gated."' This combination of notice and opportunity for review
should satisfy any procedural due process challenge." 1
C. Equal Protection Argument
A legal challenge alleging violation of the equal protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment could arise because certain
types of occupational licenses are exempted from these provi-
sions.m However, as noted in a 1995 opinion issued by the Alaska
Attorney General's office, "the excluded licenses are reasonably
distinguished from the others so that the distinctions should sur-
vive a constitutional challenge on equal protection grounds."
For section 25.27.244 to survive a challenge on these grounds, a
court would have to find that there is a legitimate purpose for the
statute and that "the distinctions [the legislature has] drawn bear
a fair and substantial relationship" to the statute's purpose.m The
purpose of the statute is to "increase the effectiveness of the child
support collection program to assist in family self-sufficiency and
meet federal program requirements. '' c To explain the distinction
between the types of occupational licenses, the Attorney General
gave the following rationales: (1) "there are policy reasons to pro-
mote the maintenance of foster care and daycare licenses that do
not apply to the other types of licenses covered by the bill"; (2)
"business licenses . .. are less substantive and individualized than
200. Id §§ 25.27.244(f),25.27.246(e).
201. In Thompson v. Ellenbecker, 935 F. Supp. 1037 (D.S.D. 1995), discussed
supra in notes 183-91 and accompanying text, the court also rejected plaintiffs'
challenge on procedural due process grounds. Plaintiffs objected to a statutory
provision that required them to sign a stipulation and agreement in which they
would promise to remain current in child support payments. See Thompson, 935
F. Supp. at 1040. Although such a provision is not included in Alaska Statutes
sections 25.27.244 or 25.27.246, the court's response is worth noting. Specifically,
the court found the provisions did not violate procedural due process protections:
[t]his law would be a toothless tiger if a person who had not paid child
support payments as previously ordered could orally agree to make child
support payments in order to get a drivers license and then cease making
payments as soon as he or she actually received the new license. The
stipulation provides a means by which the [s]tate could ... enforce the
child support obligations by seeking to cancel or suspend a drivers li-
cense issued as a result of such stipulation.
Id. at 1041.
202. See supra notes 157-60 and accompanying text.
203. Op. Alaska Att'y Gen. No. 883-95-0078 (June 15, 1995).
204. See Alaska Pac. Assurance Co. v. Brown, 687 P.2d 264, 269 (Alaska 1984).
205. Sonneman v. Knight, 790 P.2d 702, 705 (Alaska 1990).
206. ALASKA STAT. § 25.27.244(q)(2)(A) (Michie 1996).
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the included types of licenses"; and (3) "a fisherman's limited entry
permit... has an intrinsic value" and the "CSED can lien, seize
and sell" it.2' The Attorney General concluded that "[t]hese char-
acteristics distinguish the exempted types of licenses from those
included, and the distinctions are fairly and substantially related to
the purpose of obtaining support for children." ' If the Alaska
courts accept these conclusions, section 25.27.244 will survive a
challenge based on equal protection grounds.2
In summary, the statutes' provisions dealing with the denial of
issuance or renewal of occupational licenses are most vulnerable to
challenges under the due process clause. The pivotal question in
such a challenge will be whether a denial under these circum-
stances implicates a fundamental right. It is most likely that courts
will decide that a fundamental right is not implicated. It is less
clear whether these provisions bear a rational relation to the gov-
ernment's purpose. The provisions for both suspension of driver's
licenses and the denial of issuance or renewal of occupational li-
censes seem to satisfy the procedural requirements of the due
process clause. Finally, because the distinctions between the ex-
empted types of licenses from those included appear fairly related
to the purpose of enforcing child support, section 25.27.244 will
probably survive a challenge under the equal protection clause.
V. NEGATIVE PUBLICITY THROUGH "MOST WANTED" LISTS
Despite the increasing comprehensiveness of national com-
puter databases, which contain extensive information on delin-
quent noncustodial parents, many custodial parents are able to
avoid their child support obligations by changing their names, so-
cial security numbers or birth dates to evade detection through
computer searches.211 Where technology has failed, old-fashioned
methods often succeed. The newest enforcement technique in the
arsenal of available punitive mechanisms designed to force delin-
quent noncustodial parents to meet their obligations is the "most
wanted" list. A typical "most wanted" list consists of profiles, and
207. Op. Alaska Att'y Gen. No. 883-95-0078.
208. Id.
209. In Thompson v. Ellenbecker, 935 F. Supp. 1037 (D.S.D. 1995), the court
summarily rejected plaintiffs' equal protection argument, stating:
Restrictions on renewal of drivers licenses imposed on child support ob-
ligors owing more than $1,000 in arrearages is different than the reme-
dies available to collect debts from persons owing other types of debts.
However, the Court does not find such treatment is so unrelated to the
achievement of the legitimate purpose of collecting child support so as to
be irrational.
Id. at 1041.
210. See Calhoun, supra note 59, at 921.
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sometimes pictures, of the ten most egregious child support obli-
gors in a state. For example, Mississippi's statute authorizing the
creation of such a list allows its child support enforcement agency
to
release to the public the name, photo, last known address, ar-
rearage amount and other necessary information of a parent who
has a judgment against him for child support and is currently in
arrears in the payment of this support. Such release may be in-
cluded in a "Most Wanted List" or other media in order to solicit
assistance.2 n
These lists are generally published in newspapers within the
state212 and turned into posters which are then posted in public
buildings.213 Many are also posted on sites on the World Wide
Web.24 The rationale behind this technique is obvious: publicly
shame these "dead-beat parents" into paying up.25  Media in-
volvement in a shame campaign has proven to be effective. 26 It
serves several purposes: it can strongly convey the message that
society will not tolerate nonpayment of child support obligations; it
can stimulate the eyes and ears of the public to be on the lookout
for child support scofflaws; and it can convince many runaway par-
ents to stop running and face the support obligations they have to
the children they have abandoned.2' Alaska should consider en-
acting such a law to complement the existing punitive measures
designed to reduce nonpayment of child support obligations. The
Alaska legislature can model this law after similar efforts in other
states.
Several states are currently working on legislation that would
allow production and publication of "most wanted" lists. 218 An
211. See MIss. CODEANN. § 43-19-45 (1993).
212. See Payments Increase Around Holidays, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Dec.
24, 1995, at 3.
213. See Frances Schwartzkopff, Two on Deadbeat-Dads Poster are Located,
ATLANTA CONST., Aug. 24, 1994, at C2.
214. See Matthew Bowers, Virginia Will Jump Onto the Internet to Try to Lo-
cate Deadbeat Parents, VIRGINIAN-PILOT AND LEDGER-STAR (Norfolk), Feb. 19,
1996, at B1. The address for Massachusetts's child support Web site is
<http://www.mst.oa.net/ten.html>. See icL
215. As noted in a recent Hawaii bill, "[p]ublic assistance and embarrassment
have located many parents and caused others to come forward to meet their re-
sponsibilities before they appear on a poster." S. 599, 18th Leg. Sess. § 1 (Haw.
1995).
216. See, e.g., New List Out of Deadbeat Parents, COLUMBUS DISPATCH (Ohio),
Oct. 31, 1995, at 3C (citing impressive statistics for Franklin County, Ohio: "Nine
out of 10 past poster parents have been tracked down and turned in. Of 53 par-
ents featured on the first six posters, 48 have been found.").
217. See id.
218. See, e.g., S. 2260,79th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 1 (Miss. 1996).
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Arizona bill would allow the publication of "the top ten most
wanted for child support posters statewide in local newspapers." ' 9
The bill also provides that these lists shall be posted in the follow-
ing places: (1) cable television stations; (2) state offices; (3) United
States post offices; and (4) "any other place that would enhance
the public's awareness of the top ten most wanted for child sup-
port." m Hawaii's pending legislation would only affect obligors
who are twelve or more months in arrears."2' In addition, it re-
quires the child support enforcement agency to give notice to the
obligors and to provide an opportunity to the obligor to avoid
publicity through payment of arrearages or by entering into a
payment agreement.
This method of enforcement has proven to be quite effective.
For example, since Massachusetts began using "most wanted"
posters three years ago, twenty-four out of thirty-one fugitive de-
linquent obligors have been located and $350,000 has been recov-
ered.m Other states have reported similarly impressive statistics.
In Franklin County, Ohio, 90% of delinquent noncustodial parents
formerly featured on "most wanted" posters have been tracked
down and turned in.'2 Even more impressive, over 172 fugitive
parents have been apprehended since 1989 under Oklahoma's
poster program.'
The most obvious legal concern raised by the use of "most
wanted" posters is violation of an obligor's right to privacy. The
Alaska Attorney General's office has released two opinions on this
issue--one in 1983, which recommended against "publication of
information regarding obligors who are allegedly in arrears,"' and
one in 1989, which advised that release of a list of child support
obligors who are in arrears is permissible.m In the 1983 opinion,
the Attorney General noted that "[t]here is no specific or implied
provision in the state statutes that a publication such as the one
proposed in the regulation would be a means of child support,"
and that therefore "the only purpose... attribut[able] to this pro-
219. S. 1214, 42d Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. § 1(B) (Ariz. 1996).
220. Id.
221. See S. 599, 18th Leg. Sess. § 2 (Hav. 1995).
222. See id
223. See Joe Heaney, Governor Unveils New Deadbeat Parents' List, BOSTON
HERALD, Nov. 9, 1995, at 20.
224. See New List Out of Deadbeat Parents, COLUMBUS DISPATCH (Ohio), Oct.
31, 1995, at 3C. Since Franklin County's poster program began three years ago,
more than $118,000 has been collected. See id.
225. See Ten Absent Parents Listed; 172 Caught Since 1989, DAILY
OKLAHOMAN, Apr. 9, 1995, at 26.
226. Op. Alaska Att'y Gen. No. 366-688-83 (July 11, 1983).
227. See Informal Op. Alaska Att'y Gen. No. 661-89-0405 (May 30, 1989).
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posed regulation is that an obligor might be threatened or shamed
into paying."' Citing Tollefson v. Price, 9 the Attorney General in
1983 suggested that publication of a list of delinquent child support
obligors "for the express purpose of humiliating, harassing, vexing
and annoying" them so that they will ultimately meet their child
support obligations is not permissible, even if authorization to do
so were embodied in regulations/ m However, in the 1989 opinion,
the Attorney General based his opinion regarding this issue on
Alaska's public records statutes, which requires that all records in
the possession of state agencies are to be considered public unless
they are required to be kept confidential by state or federal law.231
Since "there is no state statute ... [or] federal law.., which pro-
hibits release of this information . . . [] the analysis turns on
whether the privacy clause of the Alaska Constitution prohibits
disclosure.",1
This analysis requires a balancing test, in which the public in-
terest in disclosure is weighed against the individual's reasonable
expectation of privacy.233 In the area of child support enforcement,
any expectation of privacy has been lowered by the many statutes
designed to enhance the enforcement of child support obliga-
tions.2m The public interest in the dissemination of this informa-
tion is also quite high: "The legislature finds that the effect on the
general public of the failure of parents to support their children is
vast and far reaching. The harmful effects of unpaid child support
touch not only the poor, but reach far beyond, diminishing the
overall quality of life for all Alaskans."2 5 While "sensitive per-
sonal information" may be subject to protection under the right of
privacy,3 the Attorney General noted in 1989 that "[a] good ar-
228. Op. Alaska Att'y Gen. No. 366-688-83.
229. 430 P.2d 990 (Or. 1967) (holding that it was an invasion of privacy for a
merchant to publish notice of a bad debt). Tollefson was severely limited by An-
derson v. Fisher Broadcasting Co., 712 P.2d 803 (Or. 1986), which held that the
publication of the fact of legitimate debt would not constitute a tort. The Alaska
Courts have yet to decide this issue. See Informal Op. Alaska Att'y Gen. No. 661-
89-0405.
230. See Op. Alaska Att'y Gen. No. 366-688-83.
231. See Informal Op. Alaska Att'y Gen. No. 661-89-0405; see also ALASKA
STAT. § 09.25.120 (Michie 1996).
232. Informal Op. Alaska Att'y Gen. No. 661-89-0405.
233. See id.
234. See supra notes 21-55 and accompanying text.
235. Act of July 3, 1984, ch. 144, 1984 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. § 1 (codified at
ALASKA STAT. § 01.10.070 (Michie 1996)).
236. Doe v. Alaska Superior Court, 721 P.2d 617, 629 (Alaska 1986) (holding
that the type of information subject to protection under the right of privacy in-
cludes "the type of personal information which, if disclosed even to a friend,
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gument can be made that the fact that a child support obligor is in
arrears, while 'sensitive'..., is not 'personal.'"3r "'When a matter
does affect the public, directly or indirectly, it loses its private
character, and can be made to yield when an appropriate public
need is demonstrated. ' ' s In light of the fact that the nonpayment
of child support obligations affects children, custodial parents and
the public at large, the balancing test should weigh in favor of
"disclos[ure] in response to a public records request under state
law."29 Therefore, the Alaska legislature should consider enacting
a publication provision allowing the dissemination of information
concerning delinquent child support obligors; such a provision
should withstand a challenge under the constitutional right to pri-
vacy.
VI. CONCLUSION
When the current Alaska provisions for enforcement of child
support are compared to those of other states, several weaknesses
become apparent. As noted earlier, the Alaska statute providing
for prosecution and conviction for failure to pay child support has
rarely been utilized.2' The statute providing for conviction for
aiding another to avoid paying child support has yet to be used.241
As the statute providing for prosecution and conviction for failure
to pay child support is currently written, there are no threshold re-
quirements for conviction-no distinction is made between parents
who fail to meet one month's child support obligation and parents
who have failed to meet their obligations for years. The problem
with this lack of distinction is that there is insufficient guidance on
which cases are egregious enough for a criminal conviction. As a
result, courts and prosecutors might rely almost exclusively on the
civil provisions-which they currently do. This would result in de
facto under-enforcement of a criminal activity that the legislature
has clearly indicated should be punished. While this crime ought
to have levels of offenses, the proper way to distinguish between
these levels of criminal activity is not with enforcement and non-
enforcement. Instead, Alaska ought to make flagrant nonpayment
of child support a felony and reserve misdemeanor convictions for
those with less egregious conduct.
Although application of these criminal provisions appears dif-
could cause embarrassment or anxiety").
237. Informal Op. Alaska Att'y Gen. No. 661-89-0405.
238. Id (quoting Doe, 721 P.2d at 630).
239. kd
240. See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
241. Search of Westlaw, AK-CS database, for cases containing "AS 25.25.305"
(Apr. 3, 1997).
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ficult due to deficiencies in the statutes, application of Alaska
Statutes sections 25.27.244 and 25.27.246, which allow suspension
of driver's licenses and denial of issuance or renewal of occupa-
tional licenses, should not pose as many problems. Similarly,
should Alaska enact legislation allowing the publication of "most
wanted" child support obligor lists, such legislation would be more
easily applied than criminal provisions.
License restrictions and "most wanted" lists have other advan-
tages over the criminal statutes. Most obviously, although these
alternative provisions punish criminal conduct, they provide penal-
ties that are much less harsh than loss of liberty. For this reason,
judges and prosecutors might be more inclined to enforce license
restrictions and to utilize "most wanted" lists in situations where
they are now reluctant to impose jail sentences. This would enable
them to reserve prosecution under the criminal provisions as a last
resort-for those obligors for whom the license restrictions and
"most wanted" lists were not successful. These hard-core, egre-
gious cases are more suitable candidates for criminal penalties than
the average delinquent obligor.
In Alaska's child support enforcement system last year, there
were collections in only 17.2% of the 45,638 total cases. 42 These
percentages placed Alaska thirty-fourth among the fifty states and
the District of Columbia. 43 The criminalization of the aiding and
abetting of nonpayment of child support, the move to implement
license restrictions, and the continued interest in publication of
"most wanted" lists all "clearly indicate[] society has an active in-
terest in achieving high[er] levels of compliance with parental child
support obligations. Simply put, society benefits through stricter
enforcement of private obliations by avoiding an unnecessary
drain on the public coffers."' Although serious concerns remain
about the use of punitive mechanisms as a means of "vindicating"
society's interest in responsible payment of child support,45 the de-
terrent effect which will most likely result in fewer prosecutions,
thereby limiting the potential for damaging the parent-child rela-
tionship. The overwhelming success of these punitive mechanisms
and society's interest in the fulfillment of parental obligations
should encourage judges, prosecutors and the Alaska legislature
both to enforce the available punitive mechanisms and to imple-
ment additional punitive mechanisms.
Pamela Forrestall Roper
242. See Moss, supra note 5, at 4A. The rates of collection ranged from 5.4%
(Arizona) to 38.5% (Vermont). See id.
243. See id
244. Allen, supra note 17, at 315.
245. See id.
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